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•	 If	Russia	is	to	follow	an	evolutionary	path	to	democracy,	then	the	regime	must	be	ready	to	draw	
the	 so-called	 ‘non-systemic’	 opposition	 into	 political	 processes.	This	 gradualist	 formula	 for	
democratic	change	is	also	the	formula	for	political	stability.
•	 A	number	of	 liberalising	 reforms	conducted	by	 the	 regime	 in	 response	 to	widespread	protests	
following	the	December	2011	State	Duma	election	gave	grounds	for	optimism	that	this	process	is	
now	underway.
•	 However,	 any	hopes	 that	 these	 events	would	kick-start	democratic	 reforms	were	 short-lived.	
Rather	than	draw	in	opponents,	the	regime	has	sought	to	 isolate	them,	using	a	combination	of	
reform,	non-reform,	dividing	tactics	and	repression.
•	 But	the	results	have	not	been	positive.	The	non-systemic	opposition	is	under	increasing	pressure,	
having	seen	its	options	all	but	reduced	to	more	protesting.	It	is	also	showing	signs	of	radicalisation.	
At	the	same	time,	the	Kremlin’s	uncompromising	approach	is	undermining	regime	stability.
•	 The	 pressure	 is	 building	 in	 the	 Russian	 political	 system.	The	 combination	 of	 repression	 and	
radicalisation	could	easily	see	political	stagnation	degenerate	into	instability	and	the	EU	should	
take	this	new	dynamic	into	account	in	its	future	policy	planning.
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At	the	end	of	2011,	Russian	politics	took	a	surpris-
ing	turn.	After	tolerating	sub-competitive	elections	
for	much	of	the	previous	decade,	society	reached	
its	 tipping	point	as	 tens	of	 thousands	took	to	the	
streets	to	vent	their	frustrations	at	election	fraud	in	
the	aftermath	of	the	State	Duma	election.	Using	the	
white	ribbon	as	their	symbol	and	voicing	demands	
for	fair	elections	as	well	as	democratic	reform,	this	
‘protest	movement’	persisted	throughout	2012,	as	
Russia	experienced	an	unprecedented	wave	of	‘mass	
actions’	in	towns	and	cities	across	the	federation.	
While	 the	 root	 cause	 of	 these	 protests	 continues	
to	be	debated,	its	consequence	appeared	clear	cut:	
Russia	had	witnessed	the	re-awakening	of	opposi-
tion	politics	with	the	potential	 to	cajole	the	post-
Yeltsin	 regime	 into	 the	next	 round	of	democratic	
reform.
By	the	spring	of	2012,	the	out-going	administration	
of	Dmitri	Medvedev	made	two	key	concessions	that	
promised	to	liberalise	politics	and	draw	in	the	non-
systemic	opposition.1	Amendments	made	in	April	
2012	 to	 the	 law	 ‘On	 Political	 Parties’	 introduced	
sweeping	 changes	 to	 the	 party	 system,	 easing	
restrictive	registration	requirements.	By	the	sum-
mer	of	2012,	the	number	of	parties	in	the	country	
had	almost	quadrupled,	with	dozens	more	waiting	
to	be	registered.	This	reform	was	quickly	followed	
by	the	reconstitution	of	governor	elections,	a	law	
signed	by	Medvedev	in	May,	replacing	the	procedure	
of	presidential	appointment	and	overturning	what	
was	perhaps	the	single	biggest	democratic	deficit	of	
Vladimir	Putin’s	second	term	of	office	(2004-2008).	
In	the	meantime,	the	protest	movement	took	steps	
to	 consolidate,	 forming	 an	opposition	 ‘Coordina-
tion	Council’	 in	October	 2012,	marking	 its	 trans-
formation	from	‘protest	movement’	to	‘organised	
opposition’.
But	a	year	is	a	long	time	in	politics,	and	what	appears	
to	be	progress	is	often	something	quite	different.	As	
argued	below,	rather	than	conduct	genuine	reforms	
to	provide	a	reasonable	constitutional	outlet	for	the	
non-systemic	opposition,	the	regime	has	pursued	a	
1	 	‘Non-systemic	opposition’	refers	to	those	individuals	and	
groups	denied	the	opportunity	to	compete	in	elections	and	
participate	in	formal	politics.	Conversely,	‘systemic	opposi-
tion’	includes	registered	opposition	parties	and	individuals	
who	typically	have	a	constructive	relationship	with	the	re-
gime	and	are	‘part	of	the	system’.
strategy	of	isolating	them	from	political	processes	
altogether,	 using	 a	 combination	 of	 regressive	
reform,	non-reform,	dividing	tactics	and,	increas-
ingly,	repression.	This	strategy	has	served	to	weaken	
the	non-systemic	opposition,	but	also	to	radicalise	
them.	 However,	 any	 notion	 that	 the	 Kremlin	 is	
benefiting	from	this	uncompromising	approach	is	
erroneous.	Rather	than	stabilise	the	political	situa-
tion,	this	approach	is	undermining	regime	stability.
As	 a	 result,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 see	 any	 winners	 12	
months	after	the	December	2011	State	Duma	elec-
tion.	Despite	the	efforts	of	both	sides	to	strengthen	
their	respective	positions,	the	non-systemic	oppo-
sition	and	the	regime	are	under	pressure	like	never	
before.	But	with	the	non-systemic	opposition	look-
ing	and	sounding	more	radical,	and	with	the	regime	
intent	on	restoring	its	authority	at	all	costs,	despite	
the	clear	risks	entailed,	this	pressure	continues	to	
build.
The false promise of reform
On	February	20,	2012,	and	against	the	backdrop	of	
huge	demonstrations	in	Moscow	and	several	other	
cities,	President	Medvedev	took	the	unprecedented	
step	 of	meeting	with	 representatives	 of	 the	 non-
systemic	 opposition,	 including	 Boris	 Nemtsov,	
Vladimir	Ryzhkov	and	Sergei	Udalstov	–	vocal	critics	
of	the	regime	and	key	figures	in	the	protest	move-
ment	that	was	gathering	momentum.	The	purpose	
of	 the	meeting	was	 to	 discuss	Medvedev’s	 plans	
for	easing	party	registration	requirements	and	re-
instigating	the	direct	election	of	regional	governors.	
Both	 the	meeting	 and	 the	 planned	 reforms	were	
seen	as	a	concession	to	the	non-systemic	opposition	
who,	among	other	things,	were	demanding	greater	
participation	for	excluded	groups	in	the	electoral	
process.
However,	when	reviewing	the	past	year	in	Russian	
politics,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 country’s	democratic	
development,	as	well	 as	 the	overall	health	of	 the	
political	 system,	 took	 a	 step	 back	 largely	 as	 a	
consequence	of	these	reforms.	Not	only	were	they	
pre-meditated	attempts	to	strengthen	the	regime,	
they	 also	 created	 a	host	 of	new	obstacles	 for	 the	
non-systemic	opposition.	In	fact,	these	‘regressive	
reforms’	were	part	of	the	overall	strategy	to	isolate	
the	non-systemic	opposition	from	larger	political	
processes.
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This	is	particularly	true	of	Medvedev’s	amendments	
to	party	law	as	the	first	major	reform	of	2012.	Rus-
sia’s	party	system,	it	should	be	noted,	had	largely	
consolidated	 in	 the	 period	 2001-2011,	 thanks	 in	
no	small	part	to	the	2001	law	‘On	Political	Parties’,	
used	to	control	the	opposition	and	promote	United	
Russia.	But,	by	 the	beginning	of	2011	 it	was	clear	
that	this	party	system	was	losing	its	attraction	for	
the	regime,	making	its	overhaul	a	likely	task	for	the	
incoming	Putin	administration	in	2012.	In	fact,	there	
is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 government	was	
planning	to	ease	party	registration	requirements	as	
far	back	as	2010.	Although	this	raises	some	doubts	
regarding	Medvedev’s	own	input	into	this	reform,	
it	does	show	that	party-system	liberalisation	was	
in	 the	pipeline	well	before	 the	appearance	of	 the	
protest	movement.2
The	essential	background	to	this	law	and	the	reason	
why	party-system	reform	was	likely	to	happen	is	
found	in	the	same	reason	why	falsification	was	such	
an	issue	in	December’s	State	Duma	election	–	United	
Russia’s	dwindling	popularity.	The	overwhelming	
problem	with	the	party	system	centres	on	United	
Russia’s	inability	to	collect	a	significant	portion	of	
the	pro-presidential	vote.	Both	Putin	(2000-2008)	
and	Medvedev	 (2008-2012)	 enjoyed	 consistently	
high	 approval	 ratings	 for	most	 of	 their	 presiden-
tial	terms,	but	United	Russia	has	only	been	able	to	
garner	a	 fraction	of	 this	 support	at	election	 time,	
despite	playing	on	 its	close	association	with	both	
presidents.	Irrespective	of	United	Russia’s	constitu-
tional	majority	in	the	2007	State	Duma	election,	the	
results	of	regional	assembly	elections,	2008-2011,	
reveal	that	the	party’s	average	vote	share	was	stead-
ily	contracting.	In	2008,	United	Russia	competed	in	
16	regional	elections,	gaining	an	average	64	per	cent	
of	the	vote,	but	by	2011	this	figure	had	dropped	to	
50	per	cent.3
As	 such,	 the	 explanation	 for	 Medvedev’s	 party-
system	liberalisation	is	that	the	regime	needed	to	
2	 	The	newspaper	Kommersant	ran	a	story	on	October	28,	2011	
talking	of	potential	changes	to	the	way	public	associations,	
non-profit	organisations	and	parties	were	registered,	citing	a	
government	bill	signed	by	First	Deputy	Prime	Minister,	Igor	
Shuvalov,	in	August	2010.
3	 	United	Russia	competed	in	11	regional	assembly	elections	in	
2009	and	14	in	2010,	gaining	an	average	vote	share	of	60	and	
53	per	cent	respectively	(www.cikrf.ru).
arrest	United	Russia’s	electoral	slump	and	so	avoid	
the	more	drastic	alternatives	of	replacing	the	party	
(with,	 for	 example,	 Putin’s	 All-Russian	 Popular	
Front)	or	 resorting	 to	more	electoral	 fraud.	With	
party	registration	requirements	relaxed	to	such	an	
extent	 (membership	 requirements	were	 reduced	
fortyfold)	 the	 calculation	 is	 that	 the	 opposition	
will	be	diluted	 in	a	flood	of	new	parties,	 enhanc-
ing	United	Russia’s	brand	name	and	conservative	
message	at	 the	same	time.	But,	by	 increasing	the	
number	of	 parties	 and	decreasing	 the	number	of	
unified	voting	days	for	regional	elections	to	one	per	
year	(Putin	signed	this	amendment	in	October),	the	
regime	has	also	opted	to	overwhelm	the	electorate	
and	so	further	complicate	the	task	for	newly-formed	
opposition	parties.4
The	regional	elections	in	October	2012	also	revealed	
some	of	the	additional	barriers	that	party-system	
liberalisation	 will	 present	 to	 the	 opposition.	
Although	 too	 early	 to	 talk	 of	 a	 flood	 of	 new	par-
ties,	these	elections	did	see	a	number	of	Kremlin-
backed	‘spoiler	parties’	chip	away	at	the	electorate	
of	United	Russia’s	main	competitors.	In	the	Penza	
region	(Volga	Federal	District),	the	newly	formed	
‘Communists	of	Russia’	picked	up	2.7	per	cent	of	the	
vote,	while	in	the	far	eastern	Sakhalin	region	‘The	
Communist	Party	of	Social	Justice’	gained	3	per	cent.	
These	parties	 represent	 anti-politics	 in	 its	 purest	
form,	organisations	created	to	shave	off	part	of	the	
opposition	vote,	mainly	from	Gennadi	Zyuganov’s	
Communists	 (CPRF),	 but	 not	 to	win	 elections	 or	
represent	any	constituency,	except	power	and	the	
regime	itself.
It	 should	be	noted	 that	October’s	 elections	were	
carefully	 staged	and	 low-key	 (evident	 in	 the	 low	
turnout)	in	order	to	guarantee	a	confidence	boost-
ing	victory	 for	United	Russia	 (the	party	collected	
an	average	61	per	cent	of	 the	vote	 in	 six	 regional	
assembly	elections).	Reports	of	electoral	fraud	were	
also	rife	–	suggesting	that	the	Kremlin	had	not	fully	
learnt	the	lesson	from	December’s	election.
4	 	Prior	to	this	change,	the	bulk	of	elections	occurred	twice	
yearly	on	unified	voting	days	in	March	and	October.	From	
2013,	these	elections	will	take	place	once	a	year	in	September,	
with	a	proposal	to	reduce	the	length	of	the	campaign	period	
also	under	consideration.
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The	election	watchdog,	Golos,	a	non-profit	organi-
sation	founded	in	2000	in	defence	of	Russian	voters’	
rights,	verified	more	incidents	of	fraud	in	October’s	
regional	elections	than	in	the	corresponding	round	
in	March	2011,	despite	the	installation	of	cameras	in	
polling	stations	–	another	reform	of	2012.	In	some	
cases,	multiple	cameras	were	strategically	placed	to	
view	almost	every	part	of	the	polling	station,	except	
the	ballot	boxes.
The	same	regressive	logic	can	be	seen	in	the	second	
major	‘liberalising’	reform	of	2012	–	the	revival	of	
direct	gubernatorial	elections.	This	was	also	a	reform	
that	was	likely	to	happen,	given	the	general	decline	
in	 the	 regime’s	 legitimacy	 in	 the	 post-financial	
crisis	period	 and	 the	need	 to	mitigate	one	of	 the	
drawbacks	of	a	centralised	authoritarian	political	
system;	that	responsibility	for	failure	travels	up	the	
chain	of	command.
This	was	 evident	 during	 the	 devastating	 flood	 in	
Krymsk,	 in	 southern	 Russia’s	 Krasnodar	 region	
on	July	7,	2012,	that	killed	more	than	170.	As	the	
death	toll	climbed,	so	too	did	the	trail	of	blame,	with	
growing	calls	for	long-standing	Governor	Alexander	
Tkachyov	 to	 step	down.	This	 could	have	been	 an	
uncomfortable	moment	 for	 President	 Putin,	 had	
it	not	been	for	the	fact	that	it	was	Medvedev	who	
re-appointed	Tkachev	as	governor	back	in	March.	
Nonetheless,	 the	 reinstitution	 of	 direct	 governor	
elections	represents	a	timely	shift	of	responsibility	
from	the	head	of	state	to	the	voter,	in	a	period	of	
intense	scrutiny.
But	like	the	party-system	reform,	this	reform	also	
has	enough	provisions	 to	 isolate	unwanted	oppo-
sition	candidates	and	prevent	 their	participation.	
The	inclusion	of	so-called	‘municipal	filters’,	which	
oblige	candidates	to	collect	a	percentage	of	signa-
tures	from	deputies	and	municipal	leaders	in	order	
to	run	for	office,	raise	significant	barriers	to	opposi-
tion	candidates,	and	this	was	evident	in	October’s	
governor	 elections	 when	 half	 the	 candidates	 (17	
out	of	34)	 failed	 to	make	 it	 through	 the	filters	 to	
take	part	in	the	elections.	In	central	Russia’s	Ryzan	
region,	 10	parties	 forwarded	 candidates	but	only	
4	actually	competed	in	the	gubernatorial	election.	
As	a	result,	a	region	that	was	ripe	for	an	upset	saw	
unpopular	 incumbent,	 Oleg	 Kovalev,	 re-elected	
with	64	per	cent	of	the	vote.
From reform to repression:  
the opposition under pressure
Despite	 the	 regressive	 nature	 of	 these	 ‘liberal’	
reforms,	there	are	still	reasons	to	claim	that	‘oppo-
sition	politics’	experienced	some	kind	of	revival	in	
Russia	 in	2012.	United	Russia’s	poor	result	 in	 the	
December	2011	State	Duma	election	altered	the	bal-
ance	of	power	in	the	lower	chamber,	meaning	that	
the	new	Sixth	Duma	Convocation	is	likely	to	see	a	
more	constructive	approach	from	the	party	of	power	
towards	the	systemic	opposition	of	A	Just	Russia,	
the	Communists	(CPRF)	and	Vladimir	Zhirinovsky’s	
Liberal	Democrats	(LDPR).	More	importantly,	2012	
saw	some	positive	developments	on	the	part	of	the	
non-systemic	opposition	that	gave	general	grounds	
for	optimism.
A	good	example	can	be	seen	in	the	resurrection	of	
Vladimir	Ryzhkov’s	Republican	Party.	Both	the	party	
and	its	leader	are	survivors	of	the	Yeltsin	period,	but	
Ryzhkov’s	opposition	to	Putin	and	subsequent	fall	
from	grace	 in	 the	2000s	was	accompanied	by	his	
exit	from	the	political	scene	and	the	suspension	of	
his	party’s	registration.	In	May	2012,	the	Ministry	
of	Justice,	under	pressure	from	the	European	Court	
of	 Human	 Rights	 re-registered	 the	 Republican	
Party,	which	then	merged	with	other	non-systemic	
opposition	 (the	Boris	Nemtsov/Mikhail	Kasyanov	
‘For	 Russia	 without	 Lawlessness	 and	 Corruption’	
coalition)	to	form	the	Republican-PARNAS	party.	In	
October’s	municipal	elections,	the	party	managed	
to	send	one	deputy	to	the	Barnaul	City	Council	in	
Western	Siberia’s	Altai	region,	after	gaining	5.4	per	
cent	of	the	vote.
A	no	less	significant	development	saw	the	formation	
of	 the	 opposition	 ‘Coordination	 Council’	 (CC)	 in	
October	2012,	uniting	the	variegated	groupings	that	
comprised	the	December	protest	movement.	The	CC	
was	elected	through	an	elaborate	online	procedure	
which	included	a	pre-election	period	of	debates	and	
essay	competitions	in	which	candidates	outlined	the	
various	ideologies	on	offer.	By	the	close	of	voting	on	
October	22,	81,000	voters	had	selected	45	CC	leaders	
from	a	shortlist	of	a	little	over	200	opposition	figures	
from	left,	nationalist	and	liberal	groups.	
Despite	the	relatively	small	number	of	online	voters,	
the	formation	of	the	CC	had	great	symbolic	value,	
demonstrating	 that	 the	opposition	had	made	 the	
transition	from	loose	band	of	street	protestors	to	the	
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next	‘organised’	stage	of	development.	This	election	
also	dispelled	the	myth	that	the	protest	movement	
had	little	support	beyond	the	capital	–	Muscovites	
comprising	no	more	than	35	per	cent	of	the	total	
number	of	voters.	But	most	of	all,	the	formation	of	
the	CC	generated	a	leader	for	the	amorphous	protest	
movement	in	the	form	of	Alexei	Navalny,	the	even-
tual	winner	of	the	CC	election.	This	marked	his	per-
sonal	transformation	from	‘anti-corruption	blogger’	
to	elected	leader	and	legitimate	political	figure.
However,	these	successes,	including	the	appearance	
of	an	opposition	Coordination	Council,	have	masked	
the	gradual	isolation	and	radicalisation	of	the	non-
systemic	opposition	throughout	2012.	This	has	been	
a	result	of	the	regressive	reforms	already	mentioned	
–	those	that	effectively	foreclosed	constitutional	ave-
nues	to	challenge	the	regime	–	but	also	of	the	Krem-
lin’s	efforts	at	dividing	the	opposition.	By	the	spring	
of	2012,	the	non-systemic	opposition	had	become	
more	 isolated	and	more	radical	by	 the	simple	act	
of	the	systemic	opposition	staying	away	from	the	
protests.	Although	difficult	to	substantiate,	 there	
is	little	doubt	that	the	authorities	moved	quickly	to	
prevent	the	systemic	and	non-systemic	opposition	
from	uniting,	utilising	their	cosy	relationship	with	
Zyuganov	and	other	‘system’	opposition	leaders.
As	early	as	December	2011,	shortly	after	the	State	
Duma	election,	there	were	signs	that	the	Communist	
Party	(CPRF)	 leadership	was	not	going	to	support	
the	protest	movement.	An	announcement	by	 the	
Sverdlovsk	branch	of	the	CPRF	on	December	8,	2011,	
urged	supporters	to	stay	at	home	and	not	take	part	
in	 demonstrations	 planned	 for	 Yekaterinburg	 on	
December	10,	citing	the	possibility	that	the	authori-
ties	would	view	them	as	illegal	and	administer	fines.	
Sverdlovsk,	it	should	be	noted,	as	part	of	the	Urals	
industrial	 heartland,	 is	 considered	 the	 backbone	
of	 Putin’s	 support	 and	 large-scale	 protests	 here	
would	have	struck	a	serious	blow	to	Putin	and	to	
the	regime’s	legitimacy	as	a	whole.	
Elsewhere,	representatives	of	the	systemic	opposi-
tion	have	mirrored	 the	CPRF’s	 position.	While	A	
Just	 Russia	 has	 struggled	 to	 control	 its	members	
for	much	of	 the	year,	 it	has	nonetheless	discour-
aged	contact	between	its	supporters	and	the	protest	
movement.	 Party	 leader,	 Sergei	 Mironov,	 reiter-
ated	 the	 official	 line	 at	 the	party’s	 conference	 in	
October	 2012,	 warning	 the	 party	 (un)faithful	 to	
stay	off	 the	 streets	 and	away	 from	 the	 ‘sectarian’	
protest	 movement.	The	 liberal-	 leaning	 Yabloko	
party	likewise	put	considerable	distance	between	
itself	 and	 the	 protests,	 refusing	 to	 participate	 in	
September’s	‘March	of	Millions’.	Although	Yabloko	
justified	this	decision	in	terms	of	its	unwillingness	
to	associate	with	extremist	left	and	right	groups,	by	
keeping	their	distance,	the	systemic	opposition	have	
deprived	the	non-systemic	opposition	of	a	moder-
ating	influence,	as	well	as	considerable	support.
Perhaps	a	more	significant	contribution	to	isolating	
and	radicalising	the	non-systemic	opposition	has	
come	 from	 the	 increasingly	 repressive	 approach	
adopted	 by	 the	 Putin	 administration	 since	 May	
2012.	This	toughening	stance	was	observed	imme-
diately	after	Putin’s	inauguration,	and	by	late	2012	
a	succession	of	controversial	laws	had	been	passed,	
each	more	repressive	than	the	last	and	each	harder	
to	 justify	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 official	 Kremlin	 line	 of	
‘institutionalising’	opposition	politics.5	In	the	sum-
mer	 of	 2012,	 legislators	 beefed	 up	 existing	 laws	
regulating	demonstrations	and	other	‘mass	actions’,	
re-classified	libel	as	a	criminal	offence	and	adopted	
a	web	 ‘blacklist’	bill.	These	 laws	have	 immediate	
implications	for	the	non-systemic	opposition,	who	
over	the	course	of	the	last	decade	had	been	pushed	
to	the	streets	and	the	virtual	world	of	the	internet	
as	other	political	‘arenas’	became	inaccessible.	Of	all	
the	repressive	legislation	passed	in	2012,	the	poorly	
defined	treason	law	signed	by	Putin	 in	November	
is	the	most	ominous,	leaving	little	doubt	that	the	
regime	is	stocking	its	legal	armoury	in	readiness	for	
more	political	unrest.
What	is	interesting	is	that	by	the	end	of	2012,	these	
new	laws	have	yet	to	be	used	to	make	mass	arrests	of	
opponents.	This	suggests	that,	for	the	time	being	at	
least,	rather	than	repress,	the	Putin	administration	
is	trying	to	intimidate	with	laws	intended	to	shock	
opponents	with	their	potential	for	use.	Nonetheless,	
there	have	been	 arrests	 and	 targeted	harassment	
of	demonstrators.	 In	addition	to	 the	high-profile	
two-year	jail	terms	given	to	three	band	members	of	
Pussy	Riot	in	August	2012,	the	protests	in	Moscow	
on	May	6	and	7,	which	saw	over	400	arrests,	con-
tinue	to	be	the	focus	for	retrospective	punishment.	
By	November	2012,	 19	demonstrators	 involved	 in	
May’s	public	order	disturbances	are	facing	criminal	
5	 	See	FIIA	Comment	7/2012,	‘The	first	100	days	of	Putin’s	pres-
idency	see	a	tightening	of	the	screws’,	August	9,	2012.
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charges,	with	the	authorities	reportedly	looking	for	
up	to	70	more.	But	the	authorities’	pursuit	is	rapidly	
degenerating	into	its	own	lawlessness.	In	October,	
the	Russian	security	services	allegedly	kidnapped	
opposition	activist	Leonid	Razvozzhaev	in	Ukraine	
and	returned	him	to	Russia	as	part	of	the	on-going	
investigation	 into	the	May	disturbances,	while	 in	
November	 police	 raided	 the	 apartment	 of	 well-
known	 intellectual	 and	 former	 Soviet	 dissident,	
Boris	Kagarlitsky	–	a	figure	with	a	tenuous	link	to	
May’s	violence	at	best.	Newly-elected	CC	 leaders,	
Alexei	Navalny	and	Sergei	Udaltsov,	are	also	facing	
serious	criminal	charges	which	could	yet	result	in	
lengthy	prison	terms	for	both.	Somewhat	ironically,	
the	subject	of	political	prisoners	was	discussed	dur-
ing	President	Medvedev’s	meeting	with	representa-
tives	from	the	non-systemic	opposition	in	February	
2012,	but	little	did	they	know	there	would	be	more	
by	the	end	of	the	year.
It	is	clear	that	the	protest	movement	and	the	non-
systemic	opposition	have	their	fair	share	of	radical	
views,	irrespective	of	Kremlin	intervention.	The	CC	
is	home	to	a	broad	spectrum	of	ideologies,	and	fun-
damental	divisions	exist	on	issues	such	as	privatisa-
tion,	immigration,	centre-periphery	relations,	the	
role	of	the	state	and	foreign	policy,	among	others.	
But	by	the	time	of	the	formation	of	the	CC	in	October	
2012,	the	discussion	on	how	to	reform	the	political	
system	was	making	way	for	themes	of	lustration	and	
punishing	regime	loyalists	in	any	future	post-Putin	
settlement.	What	is	more,	around	a	third	of	the	CC	
elected	leadership,	including	Alexei	Navalny,	sup-
port	the	view	that	the	Council	should	neither	nego-
tiate	with	the	authorities	nor	try	to	reach	a	compro-
mise	with	them	on	important	issues.6	Whether	the	
Kremlin	is	deliberately	attempting	to	radicalise	the	
protest	movement	is	a	different	question,	but	there	
is	no	doubt	that	the	belief	in	the	reformability	of	the	
regime	by	constitutional	means	is	diminishing.
In	many	ways,	this	hardening	of	attitudes	is	inevi-
table.	After	all,	the	belief	that	the	system	is	‘reform-
able’	is	only	sustainable	if	there	are	realistic	means	
to	 achieve	 this	 end.	This	 relates	 as	much	 to	 the	
6	 	Candidates	in	the	CC	election	campaign	completed	a	survey	
to	determine	their	‘political	compass’,	which	included	re-
sponses	to	the	statement	‘The	Coordination	Council	should	
hold	talks	with	the	authorities	and	try	to	reach	a	compromise	
on	as	many	issues	as	possible’.
reforms	that	did	not	happen	in	2012,	but	that	are	
clearly	needed	to	restore	belief.	Although	registra-
tion	requirements	have	been	eased,	parties	are	still	
barred	from	forming	electoral	blocs.	This	reform	is	
essential	if	the	various	left,	liberal	and	nationalist	
elements	 of	 the	 non-systemic	 opposition	 are	 to	
have	any	chance	of	success	in	the	electoral	process.	
Another	missing	reform	relates	to	the	way	elections	
are	administered.	By	late	2012,	there	had	only	been	
cosmetic	reform	of	election	commissions	and	Cen-
tral	Election	Commission	chair,	Vladimir	Churov,	
retains	his	position,	despite	repeated	calls	 for	his	
resignation	following	December’s	fraudulent	Duma	
election.
Pressure building: no winners 12 months 
after the State Duma election
The	 fact	 that	 the	 non-systemic	 opposition	 finds	
itself	 under	more	 pressure	 at	 the	 end	 of	 2012	 is	
self-evident:	the	regime	offered	no	realistic	outlet	
to	 challenge	 them	and	 the	 increasingly	hard	 line	
taken	by	the	authorities	is	making	life	difficult	for	
many	activists.	As	such,	the	symbolic	achievement	
of	 forming	an	opposition	Coordination	Council	 is	
just	 that	–	 symbolic.	After	making	 the	 transition	
from	street	protestors	to	organised	opposition,	the	
next	stage	of	development	looks	suspiciously	like	
a	reversion	to	protests.	The	first	decree	 issued	by	
the	newly-formed	CC	was	for	fresh	demonstrations	
in	 December.	This	 is	 despite	 falling	 attendances	
throughout	the	second	half	of	the	year	and	the	fact	
that	the	last	‘March	of	Millions’	on	September	10,	
2012	saw,	at	most,	15,000	demonstrators	take	to	the	
streets.
As	 the	 protest	movement	was	 galvanised	 by	 the	
demand	for	‘free	elections’	and	as	the	next	sched-
uled	elections	are	not	until	 September	2013,	 it	 is	
unlikely	that	the	intervening	period	will	see	signifi-
cant	mass	actions	with	the	numbers	needed	to	push	
the	regime	into	genuine	reform,	unless	there	is	an	
unexpected	 impetus	 from	a	non-election-related	
source.	In	the	meantime,	the	extent	of	ideological	
divisions	within	the	CC	makes	the	task	of	forming	
a	coordinated	set	of	policy	alternatives	practically	
impossible.	Ultimately,	 the	non-systemic	opposi-
tion	has	seen	its	options	all	but	reduced	to	broad	
sloganeering	 and	 Navalny-style	 anti-corruption	
messages	interspersed	with	displays	of	civil	disobe-
dience	–	the	same	position	it	was	in	in	December	
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2011,	but	without	the	focal	point	of	a	federal-level	
election.
That	 the	 regime	 is	 under	 more	 pressure	 twelve	
months	later	is	less	obvious.	The	reforms	conducted	
in	the	early	part	of	2012	appear	to	strengthen	the	
regime,	while	repression	would	seem	to	offer	at	least	
a	modicum	of	short-term	relief.	But,	in	reality,	the	
unwillingness	or	inability	to	compromise	and	draw	
the	 non-systemic	 opposition	 into	 the	 system	 is	
undermining	at	least	two	pillars	of	regime	stability.
First,	the	systemic	opposition	has	experienced	sig-
nificant	problems	over	the	past	12	months	and	much	
of	this	derives	from	the	fact	that	their	leaders	are	
under	orders	to	prevent	their	members	from	unit-
ing	with	 the	 ‘genuine’	 non-systemic	 opposition.	
Although	easy	to	overlook	when	assessing	regime	
stability,	the	Putin	administration’s	current	prob-
lems	will	multiply	considerably	if	loyal	opposition	
cease	to	be	loyal,	and	this	outcome	is	more	likely	
now	that	at	the	same	time	last	year.	For	the	CPRF,	
calls	for	Zyuganov	to	step	down	as	leader	intensified	
after	he	failed	to	gain	more	votes	in	the	March	presi-
dential	election	than	the	party	gained	in	the	Decem-
ber	parliamentary	election.	But	in	truth,	Zyuganov	
is	under	fire	from	elements	within	the	party	who	
want	to	see	more	protest	and	less	acquiescence	to	
the	 regime.	 Based	 on	 the	 party’s	 programmatic	
material,	the	CPRF	is	more	anti-regime	than	many	
groupings	within	the	non-systemic	opposition.	The	
party’s	cordial	relationship	with	the	authorities	is	
largely	a	function	of	Zyuganov’s	continuing	leader-
ship,	but	by	the	time	of	the	party’s	conference	in	
October	2012,	calls	to	replace	the	party’s	first	and	
only	post-Soviet	leader	were	growing	louder.
The	situation	within	A	Just	Russia	also	reveals	the	
centrifugal	 tendencies	 generated	 by	 December’s	
protests	and	by	the	regime’s	unwillingness	to	com-
promise.	In	September	2012,	the	State	Duma	took	
the	unprecedented	decision	to	strip	A	Just	Russia	
deputy,	Gennadi	Gudkov,	of	his	mandate.	Gennadi	
Gudkov,	along	with	his	son,	Dmitri	Gudkov,	and	
Ilya	Ponomarev	form	a	trio	of	vocal	and	visible	Duma	
deputies	who	chose	 to	actively	participate	 in	 the	
protest	movement	against	the	wishes	of	the	party	
leadership.	At	the	same	time,	and	indicative	of	the	
divisions	within	the	party,	a	group	of	deputies	under	
the	leadership	of	Alexei	Mitrofanov	are	attempting	
to	change	the	parliament’s	regulations	to	form	an	
independent	faction.	By	November	2012,	this	group,	
which	is	likely	to	support	United	Russia,	had	grown	
to	eight	deputies.
The	second	pillar	of	the	regime	shaken	by	the	events	
of	the	past	year	is	the	balance	between	liberal	and	
conservative	 elements	 within	 the	 pro-power	
elite	 that	has	 formed	the	basis	of	regime	stability	
for	much	of	the	past	decade.	By	refusing	to	make	
constructive	reforms	and	by	employing	an	increas-
ingly	repressive	approach,	the	Putin	administration	
has	 tipped	 the	balance	against	 the	sizable	 liberal-
leaning	minority	within	the	regime	who	view	Rus-
sia’s	future	strength	and	prosperity	as	being	tied	to	
political	modernisation.
A	clear	example	can	be	seen	in	the	decline	of	Dmitri	
Medvedev	as	a	political	figure	in	2012.	At	the	end	of	
2011,	Medvedev	was	the	main	representative	of	the	
pro-reform,	pro-regime	liberals,	the	junior	half	of	
the	tandem,	but	one	of	only	two	Russian	politicians	
capable	 of	 commanding	 a	 respectable	 approval	
rating	in	the	political	system.	But	12	months	later,	
his	authority	has	seriously	diminished.	Aside	from	
seeing	many	of	his	reforms	undone	in	the	past	year	
and	receiving	a	humiliating	assessment	of	his	role	
in	the	Russo-Georgian	war	of	2008,	his	institutional	
position	is	now	the	subject	of	doubt,	as	rumours	cir-
culate	that	his	government	is	about	to	be	dismissed.7	
In	October,	a	report	from	the	Moscow-based	Centre	
for	Strategic	Development	identified	Dmitri	Rogozin	
and	Alexei	Kudrin	as	two	possible	replacements	for	
Medvedev.	The	existence	of	this	speculation	and	the	
suggestion	of	two	replacements	with	diametrically	
opposing	ideologies	(Rogozin,	as	a	left-wing	nation-
alist	and	Kudrin,	as	a	free	market	advocate)	reflect	
the	general	level	of	regime	instability.
Ultimately,	 the	 Putin	 administration’s	 attempt	
to	restore	its	authority	at	all	costs	is	affecting	the	
entire	pro-power	elite.	By	punishing	Gennadi	Gud-
kov	for	his	 involvement	 in	the	protest	movement	
and	expelling	him	from	the	Duma	on	the	grounds	
of	mixing	business	and	legislative	work,	the	regime	
has	created	a	great	deal	of	consternation	that	this	
7	 	In	a	documentary	on	the	Russo-Georgian	war	screened	on	
August	8,	2012,	several	high-ranking	military	officers	criti-
cised	Medvedev	for	his	indecision	at	the	start	of	the	conflict.	
Owing	to	the	nature	of	media	control	in	Russia	and	the	sen-
sitivity	of	the	subject	matter,	it	is	inconceivable	that	this	pro-
gramme	could	have	been	aired	without	Putin’s	approval.
the FiNNish iNstitute oF iNteRNatioNal aFFaiRs 9
process	could	now	be	used	to	purge	all	Duma	fac-
tions.	A	cursory	glance	at	the	Forbes	rich	list	leaves	
little	doubt	that	many	deputies	are	actively	running	
businesses,	mostly	from	the	United	Russia	faction.	
If	investigating	the	economic	links	of	parliamentar-
ians	is	taken	to	its	logical	conclusion,	then	the	ranks	
of	United	Russia	could	look	a	little	thinner	and	the	
lower	chamber	a	little	emptier.	By	the	end	of	Octo-
ber	2012,	United	Russia	had	already	lost	one	deputy	
to	this	process.	Again,	the	existence	of	speculation	
surrounding	 a	 possible	 dissolution	 of	 parliament	
adds	to	the	prevailing	instability.	
By	late	2012,	the	pressure	within	the	political	system	
is	building.	The	regime’s	attempt	to	isolate	the	non-
systemic	opposition	is	leaving	a	growing	number	of	
Russians	feeling	disenfranchised	with	no	outlet	to	
vent	their	frustrations.	Moreover,	the	use	of	repres-
sion	is	a	high-risk	approach	that	quickly	reduces	
politics	to	a	zero-sum	game;	for	street	activists	and	
regime	insiders	alike.	The	implication	is	that	unless	
the	 Putin	 administration	 can	 change	 its	 current	
course	 and	 come	 to	 view	 political	 opposition	 as	
an	opportunity	to	evolve	the	political	system	and	
release	pent-up	pressure	–	rather	than	a	threat	to	
be	combated	–	this	pressure	will	inevitably	find	an	
outlet.	 In	 the	meantime,	 the	EU	 should	 take	 into	
account	the	risk	of	a	downward	spiral	of	radicalisa-
tion	and	repression	in	Russia	in	the	short	to	medium	
term,	as	well	as	the	threat	that	this	pressured	politi-
cal	system	poses	to	stability.
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